Embodiment and Subjectivity: Feminist Phenomenological Perspectives on Human Experience
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.31305/rhimrj.2026.v13n05.014Keywords:
Embodiment, Subjectivity, Feminist Phenomenology, Lived Body, GenderAbstract
This article argues that feminist phenomenology offers a strong account of embodiment and subjectivity. It shows that human experience cannot be fully understood by treating the body as a neutral biological object or the subject as a disembodied consciousness. Instead, people relate to the world through embodied existence formed by gender, social norms, culture, power, history, sexuality, race, class, disability, and material conditions. Feminist phenomenology carefully examines the traditional philosophical view that treats the universal subject as implicitly male, autonomous, rational, and detached from bodily and social contexts. Drawing on the work of Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Simone de Beauvoir, Iris Marion Young, Sara Ahmed, Gail Weiss, and other feminist thinkers, this article argues that embodiment is neither purely biological nor merely a passive surface for social meaning. The body is an active, relational, and socially situated way of being in the world. Feminist phenomenology shows that subjectivity emerges from the interaction between bodily experience and social structures. It also highlights that gendered embodiment varies according to race, class, sexuality, disability, age, nationality, and culture. The article asserts that embodiment is a site of susceptibility and social regulation, as well as agency, resistance, transformation, and political possibility. Feminist phenomenology thus provides an important framework for rethinking human experience beyond the mind-body divide and the abstract universalism of traditional theories of subjectivity. The article concludes that an adequate theory of the human subject must begin with the experienced, embodied, situated, and relational character of existence.
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